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ABSTRACT
As a competition for both popular support and political office, Election 2004 deepened
the dominant-party system in South Africa. In terms of support, the African
National Congress (ANC) did better than ever. Indeed, its leadership seemed more
concerned about internal left-wing politics than about rival parties. Conversely,
with the partial exception of the Democratic Alliance (DA), opposition parties did
worse, and appear stuck in a zero-sum competition amongst themselves. In terms
of office, ANC popularity meant greater national power and, for the first time,
control of all provinces. Further, Election 2004 revealed that the more the ANC co-
operates with its alliance partners the better it does at the polls, and the more influence
the Congress Of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu)/South African Communist
Party (SACP) have over policy. For opposition parties this dynamic is reversed.
Those parties which co-operated with the ANC to get office lost popular support,
while those which eschewed office did better at the polls. In sum, while popularity
and office are mutually reinforcing for the alliance, they constitute a dilemma for
opposition parties. Finally, while there are signs that broader social change will
pose some class-related problems for the ANC, more profound racial obstacles await
opposition parties. All this suggests that ANC dominance will grow still further in
2009.
INTRODUCTION
The outcome of Election 2004 and the trends in party support over the ten years of
post-apartheid politics are important in determining government policy, the nature
of the political system, and the consolidation of South Africa’s young democracy.
However, this paper will not address these questions directly. Rather it will address
what the election means for the primary objective of parties in democracies:
contesting political office through elections. As Joseph Schumpeter (1987, p 283)
argues, ‘a party is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the
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competitive struggle for political power’. While it is the case that parties have various
functions like goal formation, interest articulation, popular politicisation and
mobilisation, and elite recruitment, these all flow from their role in linking the
institutions of state to civil society. Without access to office all these other functions
become pretty meaningless or unsustainable, and without elections (democratic)
access to office is nearly impossible.
This starting point means that party configuration in South Africa is orientated
towards two, closely related, objectives: securing popular support and accessing
political office. While elections directly link support to office, outright electoral
victory is not the only way in which parties can gain office. Thus, under certain
electoral outcomes, minority parties can form alliances amongst themselves to
govern. Further, the advent of floor crossing in South Africa has extended the
possibilities of parties manoeuvring to access power without elections. For example,
the Independent Democrats were launched as a result of floor crossing and had
seats in Parliament before winning votes in an election. Conversely, access to office
has a significant impact on electoral success. Indeed, one of the main claims of this
paper is that access has had divergent consequences for the electoral success of the
ANC and opposition parties. Consequently, the paper will review South African
political party configuration in light of Election 2004 in terms both of competition
for popular support and access to political office, reflecting on party strategies and
exploring future scenarios.
In terms of popular support, Election 2004 was not really about the ranking of
parties in the final result, as this was widely anticipated, but more about the extent
of party support. In this respect, the paper makes two claims. First, Election 2004
revealed a growing electoral dominance by the ANC. Indeed, analysis of the
electioneering reveals that the ANC elite’s main concern was not an existing
opposition party but a spectre that haunts the liberation movement: a lingering
left-wing politics within. In this sense then, the real victory of the ANC in Election
2004 was less over an external party than over an internal disillusionment
constructed in a left register. Second, Election 2004 confirmed the dwindling
popularity of opposition parties and the disengagement of many opposition
supporters.
In terms of access to office, Election 2004 both extended the ANC’s national
dominance over the constitutionally significant two-thirds mark and secured it the
governments of all nine provinces for the first time. Conversely, the election was
bad for opposition parties, with the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) losing KwaZulu-
Natal, and the DA failing to access office in the Western Cape, Gauteng or KwaZulu-
Natal. Further, the election revealed a fascinating divergence in the relationship
between party configurations and support at the polls. For the ANC, toenadering
(getting together) with its alliance partners was good for electioneering and gave
Cosatu and the SACP greater influence over government policy, at least for a time.
For opposition parties however, access to office and popularity seem to exist in
tension in the sense that those parties that chose to co-govern with the ANC did
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poorly at the polls, whereas those which distanced themselves from ANC office
did better. In short, opposition parties currently find themselves on the horns of a
dilemma in South African politics where they must choose between access to power
and greater electoral support, but cannot have both.
To my mind the outcomes of party competition for popular support and access
to office in Election 2004 confirm trends in the political system that have been evident
since 1994. The inverse relationship between popular support for the ANC and
that for the opposition is mirrored in an inverse dividend from party co-operation
in accessing political office. It is my view that all this suggests a deeper bifurcation
of the South African electorate into two major groups – one for the government
and one against – groups whose allegiances have proved remarkably stable over
time. Moreover, I argue that the identity of these groups is linked to enduring
apartheid era relations of racial, class and ethnic power such that today’s
government supporters were the unambiguous ‘losers’ under the apartheid system,
whereas today’s opposition voters were the comparative ‘winners’ in the past.
Notably, this boundary seems the most fundamental one in the popular political
landscape, with parties struggling to attract votes across this divide. This said, there
is some evidence that the boundary is becoming more porous, although mostly in
one direction – towards the ANC. The paper finishes by exploring key changes in
the institutions of state, market and public sphere which help explain this emerging
mobility, arguing that they suggest better fortunes for the ANC than for opposition
parties. In short, there are good reasons to assume that, as long as the ANC attends
to class-related challenges its dominance will increase in Election 2009 and probably
even beyond.
In developing this argument I begin by considering the ANC’s performance
in 2004 in respect both of popular support and access to political office. I then
examine opposition parties in the same way.
THE ANC IN ELECTION 2004
The Surprising Popularity of the ANC
As Southall (2004, p 3) observed, everybody knew that the ANC was going to win
Election 2004, but ‘it was the manner of its winning that confounded observers’.
Many anticipated that the ANC would have a reduced majority and the DA would
make gains as the principal opposition party. Two main reasons were given for the
ANC’s anticipated decline: the waning of the ‘liberation factor’ and the failures of
delivery. Additional reasons included Thabo Mbeki’s alleged lack of popular
magnetism, the Government’s poor record of job creation, and policies on HIV/
AIDS and Zimbabwe. However, not only did the ANC do better than ever, the
DA’s gains were comparatively modest, the New National Party (NNP) was
effectively destroyed and the IFP suffered moderate but significant damage, losing
control of the province of KwaZulu-Natal.
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In explaining the ANC’s success, indeed in characterising party competition
during Election 2004 more generally, most analysts have emphasised three variables:
party ‘branding’, resources and organisation. While there is much to this approach
I want to suggest that a closer look at the content and style of the ANC’s campaign
reveals a further, and crucial, element in party competition for the ruling elite: an
internal left-wing politics. Much of the ANC’s campaign in 2004, indeed, much of
the ANC’s politics of late, is not directly externally at opposition parties but internally
at a left-wing politics that haunts party leadership, principally through the alliance.
Let’s begin with the conventional analysis of Election 2004.
The ANC did better in Election 2004 than ever before, both in terms of its total
national support and its reach across the country. As shown in Table 1 it achieved
the highest percentage of the vote yet in a post-apartheid election, with 69,68 per
cent. It also improved on the absolute number of votes it won in 1999 by some
276 921 votes. Perhaps more importantly, Election 2004 revealed the ANC to be the
largest party in all nine provinces for the first time. As shown in Table 2 (Sachs 2004,
p 8) the ANC was especially impressive in the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal, the
Western Cape and the Northern Cape, indeed,  it was only in these three that the
ANC did better in 2004 than in 1994. This is significant as the ANC lost to other
parties in these provinces in 1994, securing the Northern Cape in 1999 and the
Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal in 2004. As in 1994 and 1999, the vast majority of
ANC support came from black and poor people, and it was they who voted for the
ANC (Reynolds 1994, p 190; 1999, p 181; Sachs 2004, p 12).
In the aftermath of the ANC’s victory many reasons have been advanced for
the party’s impressive showing, including the weakness of opposition parties and
some strategic mistakes. However, many of the reasons given reflect creditably on
the ANC, including a carefully conceptualised and well organised campaign (Lodge
2005);  the strength of the ANC as an organisation, especially the revitalisation of
branch structures  in the previous couple of years (Lodge 2004); the vigorous defence
of its record in government  in the previous ten years (Southall 2004) and the ANC’s
effective use of the ten-year anniversary of democracy.
This story of the ANC’s success, or a version similar to it, is pretty much common
cause amongst the various commentators on South African politics. However, I want
to suggest that it is important to analyse the specific content, and especially the
style, of the ANC’s campaign as it reflects a notable ideological difference from
those of the major opposition parties, namely a left-leaning concern with the poor,
the unemployed and the working class. While all significant parties talked about
the same five problems (unemployment, poverty, HIV/AIDS, crime and corruption),
the ANC did not speak about them in the neo-liberal register of the DA and IFP or,
for that matter, of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Policy (Gear), but
in the left register of its alliance partners. This concern with working-class politics is
reflected both in the style of the ANC’s 2004 campaign, and in the kind of political
issues which have been foregrounded by Mbeki for his second term. In sum, Election
2004 saw the ANC return to the left ground it occupied in 1994.
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Table 1
ANC National Election Results 1994-2004
1994 1999 2004
Votes % Seats Votes % Seats Votes % Seats
12 237 655 62.65 252 10 601 330 66.35 266 10 878 251 69.68 279
Table 2
National Votes for the ANC by Province 1994-2004
1994 1999 2004
Eastern Cape 2 411 695 1 617 329 188 892
Free State 1 059 313 887 091 838 583
Gauteng 2 486 938 2 527 676 2 408 821
KwaZulu-Natal 1 185 669 1 176 926 1 312 767
Mpumalanga 1 072 518 962 260 979 155
Northern Cape 201 515 211 206 222 205
Limpopo 1 780 177 1 483 199 1 487 168
North West 1 325 559 1 052 895 1 083 254
Western Cape 714 271 682 748 740 077
Total 12 237 655 10 601 330 10 878 251
SOURCE: IEC WEBSITE HTTP://WWW.ELECTIONS.ORG.ZA
SOURCE: SACHS 2004, P 8
The Return to the Left
Clearly the ANC had multiple objectives in Election 2004, including the ‘liberation’
of the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. Why ordinary citizens
need to be ‘liberated’ from their free and fair choices of previous elections is a little
puzzling, but one way of reading this is as election rhetoric intended to rekindle
the ANC’s liberation credentials. Indeed, this rhetoric makes sense in the face of
what many saw as a growing disaffection amongst the ANC’s core constituency
with a lack of delivery since 1994. As Lodge (2005) notes, the ANC’s own research
revealed less of a vulnerability on issues of delivery than on the issues of crime,
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corruption and HIV/AIDS, with several national surveys confirming that
unemployment was the issue of major concern for black voters.
In the face of this research, the ANC’s focus on the material conditions of poor
people is not surprising; indeed many parties talked about similar issues. More
remarkable is the left register of the ANC’s campaign, which stands in some contrast
to the business-friendly tone of Mbeki’s first term, founded on the neo-liberal policy
of Gear with its commitment to fiscal discipline, privatising state assets and ‘good
governance’, and a record of significant conflicts between government and Cosatu.
Indeed, in ideological terms, Mbeki’s first term was marked by a twinning of neo-
liberal pragmatism with an Africanism expressed via the notion of the African
renaissance and in the characterisation of South Africa as a society of ‘two nations’
bound by race. In the run-up to Election 2004 however, the plight of the unemployed
and the poor took centre stage, and talk of ‘two nations’ gave way to ‘two economies’.
Some may argue that this was not so much an ideological shift as a new phase of
government’s grand plan, which recognised that ‘sound economic policies’ form
the basis of a ‘development strategy to create work and improved opportunities
for the millions of South Africans who survive on meagre subsistence activities or
on remittances or grants’ (Manuel 2004). This has been a recurring motif in the
speeches of the Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, ever since the introduction of
Gear in 1996 (Lodge 1999, pp 23-4). Responding to criticism that Gear had replaced
the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) Manuel said that Gear
was a precondition for the RDP, not a replacement.
That the ‘return to the left’ is not a ‘return’ in that it was always part of the
grand plan is not a debate I want to try and settle here, not least as my main argument
does not depend on the outcome. Whatever the reasons for the ‘return to the left’,
and however short-lived this return might prove, the evidence suggests that the
ANC elite is more concerned about internal challenge from its left flank than about
external challenge from the right. This claim is based on three sets of evidence: the
nature of the ANC’s 2004 election campaign, the ANC’s public defensiveness in
respect of allegations of ‘having failed the poor’, and its attempts to patch up strained
alliance relations before the election.
Perhaps the clearest statement of the ANC’s return to the left was the party’s
election slogan ‘a people’s contract to create work and fight poverty’ (ANC 2004, p
1). Notably, this slogan echoed the popular language of the 1994 RDP, a language
which permeated the manifesto and, indeed, the ANC’s entire campaign. A cursory
analysis of the content of the manifesto reveals a profound emphasis on issues
related to material well-being, like unemployment, poverty and service delivery.
This is evident in the way the ANC projected its record in government in respect of
water, electricity, housing, education, social grants and the economy. More revealing
are the eight components of the ANC’s ‘Vision 2014’, the first two of which are ‘to
reduce unemployment by half’ and ‘to reduce poverty by half’ (ANC 2004, pp 6-7).
Not only are the majority of these ‘material’ issues, the order suggests that
unemployment and poverty are the main priorities. Further, the promises to reduce
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poverty and unemployment by half are specific and bold commitments, more
ambitious than ‘creating the conditions for one million new, sustainable jobs within
five years’ as proposed by the DA (2004) or any other party for that matter, and
quite striking, as Mbeki has avoided populist policies whilst in government. Indeed,
in its manifesto the ANC committed itself to more specific targets for the next five
years, including one million jobs through a public works programme and significant
investment in infrastructure development.
Other ANC publications reflected similar issues. Thus, the party released two
leaflets nationally entitled ‘Create Work, Fight Poverty’ and ‘Safer Communities’
[http://www.anc.org.za/elections/2004/index.html], and every edition of ANC
Today from the ANC’s campaign launch on 18 January to the election date of 14
April included at least one piece on uplifting the material conditions of South
Africans. The pro-poor emphasis of election materials was reinforced by the style
of the ANC’s election campaign, which utilised door-to-door campaigning and the
media rather than the extensive rallies of the past. While the door-to-door campaign
was in part a pragmatic response to limited funds, Lodge (2005) notes that it was
also an attempt to demonstrate responsiveness to the plight of ordinary people.
This was reinforced by Mbeki’s televised high-profile visits to the homes of poor
people, a media event aimed at the public at large but nevertheless echoed in the
deployment of all ANC leadership, including ministers, members of Parliament
and councillors in door-to-door campaigning.
What is remarkable about the ANC’s campaign is not just that the party talked
about the plight of the poor and visited them in their homes, but that it did this
despite the fact that no other major party was engaging the poor in this left-leaning
way. Indeed, the ANC made a point of not attacking opposition parties, refusing
the DA’s attempt to organise a televised debate and generally declining to be drawn
into various attempts at agenda setting in the media. In brief, the form and content
of the ANC’s 2004 election campaign represent something of a shift to the left in
the party’s public image since 1999. As Jeremy Cronin (2004), Deputy General
Secretary of the SACP put it, Election 2004 ‘was NOT a campaign fought on a
programme of privatisation and liberalisation, it was not a programme of labour
market flexibility’.
There are two further sources of evidence that affirm the ANC’s ‘return to the
left’ in Election 2004. One is the process of reconciliation between the ANC and its
alliance partners, especially Cosatu, the other is ANC defensiveness over allegations
of having lost touch with the poor. An example of the latter is an article by ANC
research co-ordinator Michael Sachs in which he argues that Election 2004 showed
both that democratic citizenship is valued in South Africa and that ‘the ANC’s
gains in percentage and absolute terms were especially strong amongst the poorest
sections of black and rural electorate’ (2004, p 8). A similar claim that ‘the poor
believe in the poll’ was made in an article in the Mail & Guardian on 21 May 2004.
More revealing, however, are Mbeki’s comments at the election victory party of the
ANC (Mbeki 2004). Here he said:
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There are some in our country and the rest of the world who had
invented stories about our government and our movement. They said
we had lost contact with the people. They claimed that the people were
angry and disillusioned with the ANC because we had failed to respond
to their aspirations. They said that the failures of the ANC government
had led to disillusionment and apathy among the youth of our country.
They said all we had done was to enrich a few politically well-connected
cronies of the leadership of our movement. They claimed that the ANC
government was little more than a bunch of corrupt individuals intent
on stealing from the people. They said we did not care for the interests
of our country’s national minorities. They claimed that the traditional
leaders were so disaffected that they would mobilise the rural masses
to reject our movement. They said the failures of the ANC government
had resulted in the birth of so-called social movements that would
succeed to persuade our people to boycott the elections. They said that
the ANC and the Tripartite Alliance were paralysed by internal divisions
and factional fights that would make it difficult for us to act together to
reach out to the people of South Africa. This week, more than 10 million
South Africans, 70% of those who voted, categorically rejected all these
false accusations.
I think it is significant that, at the moment of victory, Mbeki chose to highlight
criticisms of the ANC at all and, moreover, the particular criticisms that he did.
These choices indicate a sensitivity to allegations of popular disillusionment caused
by enduring joblessness and poverty. It seems safe to infer that these concerns were
a significant spur to the ANC’s electoral design and its toenadering with Cosatu,
especially when many of these popular perceptions were confirmed by the party’s
own work with focus groups (Lodge 2005). Just as suggestive, however, was the
ANC’s public rapprochement with its alliance partners in 2003.
The claim that until mid-2003 relations within the alliance were strained was
expressed in no less a publication than the ANC Today. The edition of 12-18 October
2001 reported that the ANC was reflecting on its relationship with Cosatu and that
the party’s National Executive Committee (NEC) was due to hold a series of bilateral
meetings with the SACP and Cosatu. According to the paper, ‘tensions within the
alliance came to a head by Cosatu’s general strike against government’s programme
of restructuring state assets, which coincided with South Africa’s hosting of the World
Conference Against Racism in Durban. This came against the backdrop of problems
in the alliance for at least the last five years, blamed on a range of ideological, policy,
strategic, structural and tactical differences.’ Further on, the paper states: ‘The NEC
identified an increasing tendency within the SACP, Cosatu and even the ANC to try
to “detach” the working class and working class struggles from the broad multi-
class struggle for national liberation …’ It warned of the dangers of this approach:
‘Lessons from other struggles teach us that the surest way to defeat the working
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class is to fight a pure class struggle.’ It would, in the process, also defeat the struggle
for national liberation and social transformation, it said. Similar comments were
made in the ANC Today of 18-24 January 2002. In the ANC Today of 19 -25 September,
Mbeki affirmed the importance to the alliance of realising the goals of the national
democratic revolution, denouncing those who sought to weaken and destroy the
alliance by driving ‘wedges between the ANC and Cosatu’.
A similar story of tensions within the alliance and moves toward reconciliation
emerges from reports on, and press releases from, the SACP and Cosatu. At its
eighth National Congress, in September 2003, Cosatu considered and adopted what
it called the ‘2015 programme’, its core strategic document for the following ten
years. According to the plan (Cosatu 2003, p 7) ‘an intense struggle is being waged
internally and outside to win the hearts and minds of Cosatu’ on three main fronts.
First, ‘some in the ANC’ want ‘to encourage “new” unions and workers interested
only in shop floor issues. This seeks to transform Cosatu and the labour movement
as a whole into salesmen of capital and sweetheart unions, whose main
responsibility would be to get workers to “understand” the constraints facing
government. This tendency was reflected in the ANC’s vicious 2001 briefing notes,
which labelled Cosatu, and in particular its leadership, as ultra left.’ The second
front is a ‘weak but increasingly vocal extreme-left group … impatient with the
limits and alliances required in a National Democratic Revolution’ and wanting
Cosatu to break the alliance and form a workers’ party that would challenge the
ANC. Third are opposition parties, which recognise Cosatu’s power and want to
use it to advance their interests.
Further, the 2015 programme (p 8) complains of a shift to the right in
government economic policy, with Gear and the rise of a right-wing hegemony in
governance brought about by a lack of working-class consultation, especially in
the alliance, where Cosatu ‘must compete to influence government policies, not
just with other civil society formations, but – much worse – with capital itself’.
Indeed, ‘the balance of forces in the Alliance favours those who want only a limited
role for the Alliance and indeed the ANC itself … In the run-up to elections relations
improve and a new sense of unity and respect for one another emerges. Once
elections are over we go back to the reality of being sidelined for another five years.’
In conclusion, ‘the Alliance has been reduced in practice to a crisis manager,
mediating mostly between the state and Cosatu. Moreover it has become clear that
the state will not necessarily abide by agreements within the Alliance – or for that
matter, even ANC resolutions’ (Cosatu 2003, p 9).
Nevertheless, the programme concludes, ‘the Alliance remains the only weapon
in the hands of the people to deepen transformation and take our National
Democratic Revolution to new heights ... Above all we recognise that the
displacement of the working class leadership of the National Democratic Revolution
is temporary, a result of our failure to tilt the balance of forces and manage
contestation within the Alliance’ (Cosatu 2003, p 10). To redress this imbalance the
2015 programme talks about the need to ‘shift the balance of power, debate in the
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Alliance and government’ (Cosatu 2003, p 11) through various measures, including
playing ‘a decisive role in the 2004 elections and shaping the elections platform,
and subsequent elections’ (Cosatu 2003, p 14).
While the Cosatu congress adopted the 2015 programme, including its
recommitment to the alliance and the 2004 election in particular, other proposals
that concerned limiting the ANC’s powers to appoint premiers and a 20 per cent
quota of ANC MPs to be from Cosatu were rejected (The Star 17 September 2003).
Writing in the ANC Today Mbeki affirmed the outcome of the Cosatu Congress,
stating that ‘our alliance has a continuing responsibility to lead our country, a
people’s contract to push back the frontiers of poverty’ (Sapa 19 September 2003).
Cosatu President Willie Madisha stated that the union was starting with a ‘clean
slate’ in its relationship with its alliance partners now that tension with the ANC
was out of the way (Saturday Star 20 September 2003).
In many ways the rapprochement between the ANC and its key allies was
driven by the same sets of concerns that drive party competition in liberal
democracies. On the one hand, the ANC needed Cosatu and the SACP for ideological
legitimacy and organisational help in winning votes. On the other hand, Cosatu
and the SACP need the alliance to influence government decision-making. These
incentives of popular support and access to power are the same that motivate
opposition parties. I will argue below that the logic of opposition party competition
is such that these incentives are, in effect, mutually exclusive. Opposition parties
can secure either access to power in conjunction with the ANC or sustained support
from voters, but not both. The case with the ANC and the alliance is the opposite,
as power and support reinforce each other. The more the alliance gets access to
power, the better the ANC does at the polls. Thus, while the relationships of the
alliance are framed by the same principles that guide party competition in the
political system, their logic is different.
That Cosatu and the SACP took advantage of this rapprochement with the
ANC at election time is manifest in a flurry of activity from the two alliance partners
after April 2004. For example, on 16 September 2004 Cosatu unions went on the
biggest strike in the public sector since 1994 over government’s refusal to grant a 7
per cent increase. The strike pitted government against Cosatu, with government
making a small concession, increasing its final offer from 6 per cent to 6,2 per cent.
It also attempted to visit its fraternal union in Zimbabwe, contrary to government
wishes, only to be thrown out of that country. The SACP launched its Red October
campaign on land and agrarian reform, pulling together a range of civil society
organisations and the ANC behind a review of the land reform process in South
Africa, especially the ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’ principle (SACP press release
15 October 2004). This direct challenge to current land reform policy has yet to
prompt a direct response from government, and seems to indicate a shift of sorts in
alliance politics.
Of course the question is how long will this ‘return to the left’ last? Will Cosatu
and the SACP manage to put the alliance at the centre of government decision-
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making, or, as Cosatu’s 2015 programme puts it, now that elections are over will the
alliance partners be sidelined for another five years? Only time will tell, but early
indications are not very positive for Cosatu and the SACP. Whatever transpires,
however, the point is that concerns about vulnerability on its left flank significantly
affected the nature of the ANC’s 2004 election campaign. To what extent the left-
leaning nature of the campaign was directly influenced by Cosatu/SACP and to
what extent it was engineered solely by the ANC is hard to know. Lodge (2005)
makes no mention of alliance input, so perhaps the party chose to frame the campaign
in left-leanings terms reminiscent of alliance co-operation around the RDP in 1994
rather than being overtly pushed by its alliance partners.
Translated into terms of party competition for votes this means that the greatest
perceived challenge to the ANC in Election 2004 was not from other parties, but
from disillusionment born of a left politics most often articulated by the party’s
alliance partners. This is a politics without a home in the current system of party
competition, so it is the politics of a phantom. That the ANC was more concerned
about this phantom than about existing parties reveals just how insignificant formal
party competition is in South Africa. Nevertheless, I would suggest that these
engagements within the alliance do act as a check on the accountability of ANC
elites in the name of the working class and the poor. Of course, just how significant
this accountability is, is debatable. Habib and Taylor (1999) have argued that the
alliance has, on balance, proved ineffectual in enabling Cosatu to influence
government policy, especially as the adoption of Gear trumps gains made for
workers’ rights in laws like the Labour Relations Act and the Basic Conditions of
Employment Act. Moreover, as noted above, the Cosatu 2015 programme points
out that the alliance partners are largely ignored by government, except at election
time.
While it might be true that the influence of Cosatu through the alliance is limited,
the question arises whether it would indeed be greater if it were an independent
workers’ party. I think not. Firstly, it seems unlikely that such a party would defeat
the ANC at the polls, and it would have sacrificed its special relationship with the
Government to complain from opposition benches. Secondly, the costs of leaving
the alliance would be huge. Southall and Wood (1999, pp 78-9) argue that there is a
good chance that such a divorce could turn ugly, with the ANC accusing Cosatu of
‘betraying the liberation struggle’, and leading to ‘some combination of a split within
Cosatu and within its individual affiliates, bitter struggles of ownership of union
assets … and the formation by the ANC of some rival union’. Further, the new party
would have to find resources to fund itself in a world unfriendly to left-wing parties.
Currently, from Cosatu’s point of view, a key strength of the alliance is some
notion of normative obligation from the ANC thanks to a shared fraternity born of
the struggle against apartheid. This fraternity makes it difficult for either side even
to imagine leaving without invoking feelings of betrayal. Leaving the alliance
effectively means leaving the community of the oppressed, a community whose
mission is yet unfinished. This sentiment is reflected in Mbeki’s comments that the
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alliance is the ‘united response of the oppressed’ (Sapa 19 September 2004) and
Cronin’s (2004) point that Cosatu doesn’t want to lobby or bargain with the ANC,
but wants ‘an ANC (that includes communists and non-communists) united around
a national democratic revolutionary programme’. Indeed, the only scenario in which
the alliance is likely to split is a somewhat desperate one where economic policy
fails and unemployment and poverty rise, creating grounds for a populist reaction,
which will probably do more harm than good.
In sum, there are good reasons to assume that the alliance, and Cosatu in
particular, helps keep the ANC accountable to an important constituency, even if
only at election time, and that this is better done through the alliance than through
the formation of a workers’ party. Somewhat paradoxically then, in South Africa at
this time, elections do deepen government accountability to the organised working
class despite the lack of a workers’ party. Further, the special relationship forged in
the alliance between Cosatu and the ANC means that this is a form of accountability
stronger than that likely to be secured by a secessionist workers’ party ‘traitorous
to the struggle’. Of course this argument holds as long as Cosatu remains strong
and the sense of a struggle fraternity endures. Indeed, the stronger Cosatu and the
SACP become, the more likely it is that they will be able to influence governance
between elections as well as for a brief period once every five years. In this respect
it is notable that Cosatu’s 2015 programme commits it (and urges the SACP to
commit itself) to building itself as an organisation and engaging the alliance and
government more ‘proactively’. Given the foregrounding of unemployment and
poverty as the key issues of Mbeki second term, and given the clear determination
of the Left to try harder, there is some chance that the ‘return to the left’ could be
more than an epiphenomenon of elections. If so, the ANC’s alliance partners might
play more of a role in governance in Mbeki’s second term than they did in the first.
In conclusion, Election 2004 confirmed both the growing popularity of the
ANC and the usefulness of the alliance in securing both a better return for the
ANC at the polls and greater Cosatu/SACP influence on government policy, at
least during election periods. These findings are largely consistent with those of
preceding elections and suggest that, in the case of the ANC, party configurations
for popular support and power are mutually reinforcing. For opposition parties
the inverse is true. Not only are they increasingly unpopular with the public, but
must choose between access to office through co-operation with the ANC and
longer-term popularity
THE OPPOSITION PARTIES IN ELECTION 2004
Unforeseen Misfortune at the Polls
As Booysen (2004) notes, Election 2004 provided some ‘sobering realisations’ for
South African opposition parties, whose position is arguably weaker than ever.
Table 3 illustrates how, despite the fact that there were more opposition parties on
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the national ballot than ever before, the total percentage of the vote accrued by
these parties shrank from 37 per cent in 1994 to 20 per cent ten years later. Further,
the support for the largest opposition party has diminished from the 20 per cent of
the NP in 1994 to the 12 per cent of the DA in 2004. Indeed, apart from the modest
2,8 per cent growth of the DA in 2004, almost all opposition parties have lost support
or held level. The only new party to do well was the Independent Democrats (ID),
but even it came in below the United Democratic Movement’s (UDM) first-time
performance in 1999.
SOURCE: SACHS 2004, P 11
Table 3
Parliamentary Opposition Party Support, National Ballot, 1994-2004
1994 1999 2004
Party % Party % Party %
NP 20,39 DP 9,56 DA 12,3
IFP 10,54 IFP 8,5 IFP 6,97
FF 2,17 NNP 6,87 UDM 2,28
DP 1,7 UDM 3,42 ID 1,73
PAC 1,25 ACDP 1,43 NNP 1,65
ACDP 0,45 FF 0,8 ACDP 1,6
UCDP 0,78 FF+ 0,89
PAC 0,71 UCDP 0,75
FA 0,54 PAC 0,73
MF 0,3 MF 0,35
AEB 0,29 AZAPO 0,27
AZAPO 0,17
Total % 38,35 33,65 30,32
Total votes 7 295 843 5 375 812 4 734 416
Commentators have identified two general problems that beset opposition
campaigning in 2004. The first was a lack of obvious differentiation from government
on key issues and the policies needed to deal with them (Southall 2004, p 3). As
implied in my argument above, this point is not as convincing as it appears at first,
for although the ANC might have talked about the same issues as other parties,
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and even shared certain broad policy outlooks, its campaign was situated
significantly to the left of those of the main opposition parties. To put the point
differently, in respect of content but especially of style, the ANC differentiated itself
very effectively from its opponents.
The second general problem (Kotzé 2004; Sachs 2004) was a lower turnout of
opposition voters (see Table 3). Kotzé suggests that the timing of the election
(immediately after the Easter weekend) might have hurt opposition parties, whose
supporters were more likely to have been away on holiday. He also refers to apathy
caused by the certainty of ANC victory, and the lack of a viable alternative to the
ANC as ‘the spectrum of opposition parties was too fragmented and sectoral’ (2004,
p 2). Sachs (2004, p 12) claims that the lower turnout of the more affluent and the
racial minorities was a non-violent form of rejecting democracy by turning to the
‘apathy of the cluster home’ and/or was due to the lack of appeal of the DA’s
Leon’s robust anti-ANC style. My hunch is that the low turnout had much to do
with perceptions of efficacy of participation in the face of a clear ANC victory, a
rational choice reinforced by a sense (revivified by the ‘ten years of freedom’
celebrations) of being on the ‘wrong side of history’. In effect, interest and identity
combined to erode the motivation of opposition voters to participate, much as it
combined to spur the enthusiasm of ANC supporters.
Table 4
Estimated Turnout by Selected Demographic Category
Demographic Group Estimated turnout of registered voters
Eastern Cape Metro Africans 84,9%
Western Cape Metro Africans 82,3%
Gauteng Metro Africans 76,7%
Limpopo Rural Africans 75,6%
KwaZulu-Natal Metro Africans 74,3%
Northern Cape Rural coloureds 73,6%
Gauteng Metro Indians 68,4%
Western Cape Metro Indians 62,0%
KwaZulu-Natal Metro Indians 61,5%
Aside from these general problems, however, commentators have pointed out
various mistakes made by the different parties. Thus, while the DA had some reason
to be upbeat about its growth, the party did not realise its election objectives. Firstly,
SOURCE: SACHS 2004, P 10
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its ‘coalition for change’ with the IFP failed to reach the 20-30 per cent support
level it desired. Secondly, the DA did not conclusively consolidate the opposition;
securing far less than half the opposition vote, despite the collapse of the NNP1.
Thirdly, Booysen (2005) states that the DA’s share of the black vote rose from 0,4
per cent in 1999 to 1,7 per cent in 2004, nowhere near the 10 per cent it had hope for.
Moreover, these black recruits ‘originated in the UDM and the IFP, rather than in
the ANC’. Thus, in addition to not consolidating the opposition vote, the DA has
made almost no gains amongst government supporters. For Booysen, a major reason
for the DA’s disappointment was its failure to project a consistent identity to the
public, vacillating as it did between liberalism and opportunism. At best, the DA is
‘liberal, multi-faceted and engaging in vigorous multi-partyism’, at worst it is ‘a
contradictory-in-terms of policy, internally inconsistent and opportunistic vote-
garnering apparatus’. Booysen attributes this ambiguity to the problems of unifying
a ‘broad church of anti-ANC sentiment’ from diverse backgrounds and an ambiguity
in ideological position and leadership style
The next biggest party, the IFP, had neither the vision nor the resources to
prepare and execute a compelling campaign, spending disproportionate amounts
outside of its stronghold in KwaZulu-Natal and relying too much on the loyalties
of its core rural voters. This was despite being confronted by the ANC’s most
impressive campaign yet in KwaZulu-Natal. Further, as I argue elsewhere (Piper
2005), the ANC undermined the IFP’s attempts to sell itself to opposition voters as
an inclusive and competent conservative liberal alternative by continued reference
to violence and apartheid-era politics. More generally the IFP finds itself in a
dilemma where it can no longer prosecute old-style coercive politics but, because
of the deadening effects of the authoritarian leadership style of its leader,
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, it struggles to operate as an effective modern party. This
failure to transform has left the IFP increasingly vulnerable to the better organised
and better led ANC. Recent attempts to rectify this problem have been simply too
little too late. The party has lost the key benefit of being in power in KwaZulu-
Natal and it is hard to see how the ANC will now let slip its advantage.
In respect of the rest of the minority parties, the NNP’s ‘dizzying flight from
government to opposition and back’ undermined its already waning credibility in
the eyes of voters (Southall 2004, p 5). Consequently, its more conservative
supporters left for the DA, and the more left leaning headed to the ANC. Further,
poor organisation and a lack of resources saw parties like the UDM, the Pan
Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Azanian People’s Organisation (Azapo) holding
steady at best. With the exception, perhaps, of the African Christian Democratic
Party (ACDP), the rest of the opposition parties were no real threat to start with.
While these subjective party weaknesses are important, it is my view that
they may explain gains and losses made amongst opposition parties but they do
1 Notably, where the combined DP/NP support in 1994 was 22,12 per cent, the combined DP, NNP, FA
support in 1999 was 16,97 per cent and in 2004 it was 14 per cent.
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not really explain the overall decline in the opposition vote. Winning votes from
opposition parties is one thing, winning votes from the ANC is another altogether,
and something that even a party which had consolidated all 30 per cent of the
opposition vote would struggle to do. Simply put, there is just so much an opposition
party can do given the dominance of the ANC, and indeed there is more to the
dominance of the ANC than good governance and good campaigning.
Key here are the attitudes of ordinary South Africans. To my mind a significant
proportion of the ANC’s supporters endorse the party because they see it as the
party of the oppressed, and the oppressed still need (mostly economic) liberation
in the new South Africa. This reasoning is based on observation of the patterns of
party political affiliation since 1994. Two claims are important here. First, the past
three national elections have revealed that the divide between the ANC and the
opposition parties is not sociologically random but follows certain widely
acknowledged social categories. More specifically, the supporters of the ANC are
overwhelmingly those who were the losers under the apartheid system: black and
poor people. Conversely, those who were (relatively speaking) the ‘winners’ under
apartheid, namely racial minorities, the wealthy and some Bantustan beneficiaries,
support opposition parties. This bifurcation of popular support is testimony to the
enduring and powerful legacy of apartheid. Thus, while the size and ranking of
opposition parties has changed quite dramatically since 1994, the overall levels of
support and the profile of opposition voters has not changed much at all. In addition,
with the exception of some losses by the IFP and NNP to the ANC in the last election,
very few voters have changed from one side of the apartheid divide to the other.
Second, this suggests that, until the racial, class and ethnic bases of power are
reconstituted, party competition occurs largely within one of these two groups so
that the ANC, PAC, Azapo, and so on, contest the ‘apartheid losers’ group, and the
DA, NNP, IFP, UDM and UCDP contest the ‘apartheid winners’ group. In practice
then, opposition electoral politics has been a zero-sum gain amongst opposition
parties rather than between opposition parties and the ANC. In this context the
strengths and weaknesses of parties help explain how they do within each group,
but there is little that parties can do in the short term to win support across group
boundaries. Of course both these claims are somewhat crude and require further
nuance. The ambiguous position of traditional leaders and of racial minorities like
Indian and coloured people needs further investigation, as do the emergent changes
in racial, class and ethnic relations. Nevertheless, it is my view that the general
description stands and that, when added to the quest for political office – the raison
d’être of political parties – it introduces the central dilemma of opposition politics:
access to office versus popular support.
The Dilemma of Popularity Versus Power
In the context of a bifurcated electorate where the vast majority return the ANC,
opposition parties have very little chance of winning office. This means that, in
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order to hold office, opposition parties find themselves forced to consider alliances
either with each other, in the rare circumstance that this is possible, or with the
ANC. The most significant example of an opposition party alliance for power was
the NNP/DA alliance after election 1999 to secure the government of the Western
Cape despite the ANC being the largest party in the province. However, other
instances have occurred at local government level. Indeed, after the 2000 local
government elections the DA and the IFP agreed to share power in local councils
wherever possible.
On the whole, though, party coalitions for power have more commonly seen
opposition parties making some arrangement with the ANC. In 1994, 1999 and
2004 the ANC and the IFP agreed to various power-sharing arrangements in the
national and KwaZulu-Natal governments on a quid pro quo basis such that IFP
access to national power was traded for ANC access to KwaZulu-Natal. While,
from the IFP’s point of view, this arrangement was driven by a desire for power,
from the ANC’s standpoint it was more about reducing conflict in KwaZulu-Natal.
Experience of IFP brinkmanship during the transition years had taught the ANC
leadership that IFP compliance was better achieved through inclusion and
recognition (especially of Buthelezi) than through exclusion (Piper 2000).
It is my view that this cooperation between the IFP and ANC has hurt the IFP
in two ways. First, it has directly undermined the IFP in the eyes of (mostly white)
opposition voters looking for a robust challenger to the ANC. This is a constituency
the IFP has targeted in every election since the 1996 local government elections
with decreasing success over time. Thus, where the party secured something like
one-third of white voters in KwaZulu-Natal in the provincial ballot of 1994 (Piper
& Piper 1995), this proportion had declined significantly by 2004. Perhaps part of
the reason for this is the IFP’s unremarkable record in government in KwaZulu-
Natal, but another is its ambiguous relationship with the ruling party. This
conclusion is affirmed by the fact that, today, most white and many Indian voters
in KwaZulu-Natal support the DA, with its vigorous anti-ANC stance. Second, co-
operation in government with the ANC has moderated the IFP’s militant Zulu
nationalism of the transition years, creating the opportunity for the ANC to gain
increasing access to IFP supporters and to win over more and more significant
numbers with each election. Such is the shift in popular support since 1994 that the
claim that rural Zulus of KwaZulu-Natal support the IFP and urban black voters
endorse the ANC is no longer true. By Election 2004 the IFP had shrunk to a
constituency of rural Zulu people north of the Tukela, with most rural people in
the south endorsing the ANC.
Perhaps the best known alignment for power between an opposition party
and the ANC involved the NNP. Following the successful coalition between the
NNP and DP which won them power in the Western Cape after election 1999, the
NNP under its new leader, Marthinus van Schalkwyk, and the Federal Alliance
(FA) entered into a formal alliance with the DP called the Democratic Alliance. This
alliance contested the local government elections of October 2000. Shortly thereafter,
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however, Van Schalkwyk decided to withdraw the NNP from the DA as ‘he and his
ilk were unable to stomach playing second fiddle to the more cerebral and feisty
Tony Leon and engaging in the politics of vigorous opposition’ (Southall 2004, p 5).
Then, following the floor-crossing period of 2002-3, Van Schalkwyk decided to join
up in a loose coalition with the ANC to seize control of the city of Cape Town and
the government of the Western Cape. According to Southall (2004, p 5) the ANC
played to Van Schalkwyk’s ‘personal ambition for office, his party’s lack of
commitment to principled opposition and its lingering lust for power’, in a ‘blatant
case of a cynical, up-and-coming bridegroom marrying a vainglorious elderly widow
for her tawdry wealth’. Whatever the reasons, the NNP’s behaviour cost it hugely
in the 2004 polls, and shortly afterwards the party decided to merge with the ANC.
In short then, the lesson to be learned by opposition parties is that co-operation
with the ANC may help with access to political office in the short term, but it is
likely to cost votes over time, with (mostly white) anti-ANC voters going to the DA
and (many black) supporters switching to the ANC. This reflects the fact that the
boundary between government and opposition supporters is perhaps becoming
more porous, but mainly in one direction, with some black opposition support now
moving to the ruling party. My view, which space prevents from developing here,
is that this has something to do with changing social relations in post-apartheid
South Africa and, more directly, with the ANC’s capture of key elites.
In contrast to the lesson that co-operation for power costs votes, there are a
couple of opposition parties, principally the DA and perhaps the ID, who have
benefited at the polls because of an overt challenge to ANC power. The DA’s record
in this respect is well known, and mostly associated with the advent of Tony Leon
as party leader after the 1994 election. As Southall (2004, p 5) puts it, ‘Leon takes
delight in pinning his criticisms of the ANC to the mast, and sailing into battle. He
loves the smell of blood, the electorate senses it, and some buy his fighting message
gladly.’ In the 1999 election this confrontational anti-ANC politics was expressed in
the party’s  ‘fight back’ campaign, which succeeded in drawing large numbers of
mostly white NNP voters disgruntled with their party’s cuddling up to the ANC.
Confronted by accusations that it was appealing to racial prejudice (the ANC
pilloried ‘fight back’ as ‘fight blacks’), in more recent times the DA has looked to
take its campaign to the townships and has formed the coalition for change with
the IFP to ‘oppose the ANC at a national level and co-govern at provincial and
municipal levels’ (Leon 2003).
While it is clear that the DA’s anti-ANC position has greatly boosted its popular
support, this is clearly a support with a ceiling. Indeed, Election 2004 suggests this
ceiling is well below the 30 per cent mark of opposition voters. Further, attempts to
win over black converts have not really worked, despite the work in the townships
and alliance with the IFP. Indeed, to my mind the coalition with the IFP undermines
the DA’s attempts to win black voters, given the widespread popular perception of
the IFP as ‘an apartheid collaborator’ and ‘ethnically chauvinist’ (Southall 2004,
p6).
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The lesson of the last few elections is that overt challenge to the ANC may
mean foregoing political office, but it is one way of winning votes. In many ways,
the success of Patricia de Lille’s Independent Democrats in Election 2004 confirms
this pattern. The ID’s success had much to do with De Lille’s public image as a
robust critic of the ANC and with the fact that she is a former PAC leader with
good struggle credentials (Hoeane 2005).
The voting patterns for opposition parties since 1994 suggest that access to
power through co-operation with the ANC sits in some tension with popular
support amongst opposition voters, especially white opposition voters. When added
to the analysis of ANC support, this pattern confirms the picture of the South African
electorate as divided most profoundly into two groups: poor black people who
support the government and racial minorities, the wealthy and some Bantustan
constituencies. This apartheid boundary has proved remarkably important in the
last three national elections, with the percentage and identity of opposition support
remaining pretty constant, especially if one considers the reduced turnout of
opposition voters in 2004. What this means is that opposition parties must either
resign themselves to a future with little power but a good chance of retaining
opposition votes (like the DA), or access to power through some arrangement with
the ANC, but at great risk to their future support (like the NNP and IFP).
However, this not the end of the story, as Election 2004 provided evidence
that the boundary between apartheid ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ is become more porous,
although mostly in one direction – from the opposition to the ANC, and mostly
from groups of opposition voters who were only comparatively winners under
apartheid: coloured minorities and Bantustan constituencies. This is obviously good
news for the ANC and bad news for the opposition parties, especially those like
the DA that rely on strong anti-ANC sentiment. It also suggests that under Tony
Leon’s confrontational anti-politics the DA may fast be approaching its ceiling
amongst opposition supporters.
FUTURE PARTY CONFIGURATION
Describing these trends is one thing, explaining them is another. So far I have largely
avoided explanation, other than to suggest that the fundamental divide in the South
African electorate places limits on the significance of subjective factors of party
performance. Thus, no matter how hard it tries, the ANC may be reaching the
zenith of popular support unless opposition voters dramatically change their beliefs.
Similarly, no matter what it does, the DA’s consolidation of the opposition vote
limits it to 30 per cent of the popular vote, and probably far less under Tony Leon.
To put the matter another way, I have stated that the boundary between government
and opposition voters is based on deeper relationships and identities from the
apartheid era, more specifically, enduring racial, class and ethnic power relations.
However, these relations are changing, albeit to various degrees. While what follows
is not, by any stretch of the imagination, a through assessment, I will make a few
JOURNAL OF AFRICAN ELECTIONS116
comments about the trajectory and pace of these changes and what they might
mean for future party politics.
To my mind there are three major axes of social change in South Africa that
follow the institutions of state, market and public sphere. First, there have been
dramatic changes in the institution of the state, which are eroding the racial and
ethnic power relations of the apartheid era, both in respect of the exclusion of black
South Africans from voting and from office in branches and levels of direct rule in
urban areas, and the ethnically-couched configurations of indirect rule in rural areas
(Mamdani 1996). However, this movement is not absolute. The realities of
demography mean the non-racial state is de facto racialised in personnel and, more
importantly, in some policies. This trajectory is reinforced by the propagation of
race thinking in the discourse of transformation and ANC ideology as well as in
lingering racism among many ‘apartheid winners’. Perhaps unavoidably, perhaps
unintentionally, race retains a radically reduced but still significant link to state
practice, if not explicit state design. It is this variable which places limits on the
openness of racial minorities to the ANC. In respect of ethnic power, the ambiguous
status of traditional leaders in state design effectively slows the decay of
undemocratic governance, if not government, in many rural areas. This is a key
factor in maintaining IFP support, and helps explain why, unlike the NNP, the IFP
will not suddenly collapse.
Second, there have not been fundamental changes in the institutions of the
economy and this has perpetuated much of the racial character of the class divide
in South Africa. Some important caveats apply, however, the most significant of
which is the growth of a black middle class in South Africa, chiefly through access
to resources of the state, but increasingly through policies of black economic
empowerment in the market place. Also significant has been greater class inequality
within all racial groups. Taken together these suggest that class divides are beginning
to cross cut racial divides, unlike the isomorphism of race and class under apartheid.
Critically, the untangling of race and class is lopsided in that, to date, it has mostly
been about the emergence of a multiracial middle class, but the working class and
poor have remained disproportionately black and are arguably worse off than they
were in 1994. In political terms this dynamic is expressed in tensions within the
alliance, especially between government and Cosatu and, as reflected in party
behaviour, is the most important challenge for the ANC leadership to contain.
Third, there have been significant changes in the public sphere which have
great cultural significance. While the public sphere is a more ambiguous entity to
define than state and government, economy and market, I use it here to refer to the
realm of public debate and it is markedly influenced by the reformed state and
enduring market players. This influence is exercised through systems of mass
communication, especially ‘global’ communication, with its Americanised popular
culture and westernised ‘modern’ political culture. Perhaps the least anticipated of
the major institutional changes, the partial ‘globalisation’ of South Africa’s public
realm, is still powerful and has implications for popular and political culture, as is
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poignantly manifest in the often ‘cosmopolitan’ quest for cultural identities evident
among the younger members of South Africa’s ‘first economy’. In this context the
resonance of Africanism is not irrelevant as much as transformed into forms that
seek admission to the world. The resonance of Africanism within the ‘second
economy’ is likely to be quite different and constructed in terms we are more familiar
with, not least xenophobia towards immigrants.
In sum, the overall trajectory of institutional and cultural change since 1994 is
changing apartheid political identities, albeit in different ways and at different
speeds. On the one hand, the ascent to power of black leadership combined with
the enduring economic position of most black people has opened tensions within
the black community (represented in alliance politics) and has reinforced a sense
of collective unfinished business. The ANC has been wise enough to turn this to its
advantage, using a semi-racialised communitarianism to trump class divides.
Nevertheless, blackness is not what it used to be. On the other hand, opposition
voters’ fear of ANC (and perhaps black) rule is being eroded by experience of
relatively competent government which has mostly secured the interests of the
middle classes and above. The ANC has been very successful in incorporating into
its governance many of this elite, especially the less privileged of the apartheid era
‘winners’.
To my mind the real struggle for the future of South African party politics lies
in the recruitment of the middle class, as it is they who dominate government, the
market and the public sphere. In this respect the major challenge for the ANC is to
maintain the support of both the powerful middle classes and poor black people.
Hence it is more (if still only moderately) concerned about an internal left politics
represented in the alliance than it is about opposition parties. For opposition parties,
and especially the DA, the major challenge is race politics. Can it, in the next five
years, start to overcome its white middle-class image to transform itself into a party
for the black middle classes? While the party has made some tentative moves, they
are far too modest and are undermined by the historically racialised thrust of Leon’s
approach. To its commitment to opposition, the DA needs to add credible black
leadership and especially a new leader, preferably someone with struggle
credentials. It also needs a clear strategy for recruiting the black middle classes.
Clearly then, the competitive challenges for the opposition are far higher than those
for government. It is hard to imagine the opposition making significant gains unless
government begins to slip up, and the chances of that are remote under President
Mbeki. Real challenge might be possible under a new president, and, if it is to have
any hope of growing in future elections, the DA needs to prepare for that distant
opportunity.
CONCLUSION
Election 2004 has confirmed the dominance of the ANC in terms both of popular
support and of control over political office. That much is common knowledge.
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However, the election also revealed some significant changes. In respect of the ANC
these involved a ‘return to the left’ in the content, but especially the style, of its
election campaign. When added to a certain public defensiveness and
rapprochement in the alliance, ANC electioneering suggests a greater concern with
an internal left politics than with extant opposition parties.
Election 2004 also revealed that the alliance is good for all its members, at
least during election time, as it boosts ANC support and Cosatu/SACP influence
over government. Moreover, there are good reasons to believe that, during election
time especially, the alliance helps keep the ANC somewhat accountable to labour,
and more effectively than would an independent workers’ party. Thus, contrary to
the liberal-pluralist model and to the expectations of many commentators,
government accountability is currently not better served through competition from
a workers’ party than through existing non-party channels.
In contrast to the growing popularity of the ANC and the synergies of alliance
configuration, Election 2004 revealed declining opposition support and the dilemma
of popularity-versus-power-sharing that faces opposition parties. This means that
opposition parties must either resign themselves to a future with little power but
some potential for growth, or access power through some arrangement with the
ANC, but at great risk to their future survival. Opposition politics centres on trading
off marginality but long-term survival against short-term, but short-lived, power.
This paper also suggests that the dynamics of party configuration for support
and political office are only partly explicable in terms of subjective party choices.
Also important is a fundamental and enduring divide in the electorate between
poor  black people who were the unambiguous ‘losers’ under apartheid and wealthy
racial minorities and Bantustan constituencies who were comparative ‘winners’.
Where changes in racial, class and ethnic power relations are beginning to
redefine popular interests and identities, this is an uneven process which is
producing a multiracial middle class, still marked by racial divides, but increasingly
distinct from the huge class of poor black people. While these changes are starting
to see the ANC recruit from the black members of the apartheid ‘winners’ category,
it also suggests that marrying this with working-class interests will be the party’s
largest challenge. Conversely, the DA needs to recruit from the black middle classes
whilst retaining an oppositional stance if it is meaningfully to challenge the ANC
for support and office in 2009. This looks the far harder task. The DA will not only
have to overcome perceptions of racial exclusivity but also the ANC’s effective
control of key social resources and domains. This is highly unlikely outside of a
widespread failure of government, especially in the economic realm.
What, then, is the future of party alignment in South Africa? If current
trajectories continue we can expect, on the one hand, the ANC’s domination of
popular support and office to increase as it absorbs a larger share of opposition
support and leadership, especially from the IFP. Indeed, I would suggest that this
would be guaranteed if the ANC could demonstrably deliver on the issues of jobs
and poverty in the next five years. In this context we can also expect the ANC to be
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more concerned about alliance relations and class politics than about the challenge
from opposition parties. On the other hand, we can expect the oppositional stance
of the DA to continue to secure it more support, but in a shrinking pool of
opposition voters and parties, until it approaches a ceiling well under the 20 per
cent mark.
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